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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

20-cr-06-01-PB

V.

February 24, 2021

10:05 a.m.

CHRISTOPHER CANTWELL

TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL J. BARBADORO

APPEARANCES:

For the Government: John S. Davis, AUSA

Anna Z. Krasinski, AUSA U.S. Attorney's Office

For the Defendant:
Jeffrey Levin, Esq.

Eric Wolpin, Esq.

Federal Defenders Office

Probation: Sean Buckley

Susan M. Bateman, RPR, CRR Court Reporter:

Official Court Reporter

United States District Court

55 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 603) 225-1453

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Court is in session and has for consideration a sentencing hearing in United States of America versus Christopher Cantwell, criminal case number 20-cr-6-1-PB.

THE COURT: All right. Here's how I intend to proceed. I would like to first review the report with the defendant to make sure he's read it and understands it. I want to determine the defendant's guideline sentencing range in the absence of a departure or variance. I then will address departures and variances together. I have certain specific questions that I want to review with the parties, and then I'll give them an opportunity to say anything else they want to say. I'll give the defendant an opportunity to speak. I'll then rule on departures and variances and impose the sentence I intend to impose. All right?

So let's start with the presentence report.

Mr. Cantwell, I have a report for you that was prepared originally on November 20th of 2020, and it was revised on December 17th. Have you seen that report?

THE DEFENDANT: I have.

THE COURT: Have you read it and discussed it with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: I have.

THE COURT: Do you feel you understand it?

1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You can be 2 3 seated. 4 Does the government dispute any of the facts or 5 legal conclusions contained in the report? MR. DAVIS: No, your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Is the defense pressing any objections to the facts and legal conclusions set forth in the report? 8 9 MR. WOLPIN: No, your Honor. THE COURT: I adopt the findings of fact and 10 11 conclusions of law set forth in the report which will be made 12 a part of the record under seal. 13 I determine that the defendant's total offense 14 level in the absence of a departure or variance is 20 and his 15 Criminal History Category is III. The guideline sentencing 16 range is 41 to 51 months. 17 So the parties have filed detailed and helpful 18 memoranda that affect my sentencing judgment. I've had a 19 chance to study those. There are three specific issues that 20 have come up that I want to talk to the parties about. 21 there is an argument that the defense has that the defendant's 22 criminal history category overstates the seriousness of his 23 criminal history and that that warrants departure or variance. 24 I want to hear from the defense on that first and then hear 25 from the government. So that will be the first issue I want

to take up.

The government has asserted in its papers that the fact that the threat was made against the victim's family member is a potential ground for an aggravating factor that I should consider in sentencing. I want to hear your argument and the defense's response on that.

And then the matter that I need the most help on is with respect to the defendant's provocation argument and how that should affect this particular sentencing judgment, and I want to focus on what I see -- and maybe there's a way to reconcile it, but it seems to me that you -- the parties have vastly different views about the events that immediately preceded the conduct for which the defendant was convicted, and I want to understand both parties' positions on that and what your reactions are to the other party's take on the sequencing of events because that can affect how I evaluate the provocation argument that the defense is presenting.

So I want to deal with those three things in that order, and then I'll turn to the government and have it make its argument for sentence and then the defense. Then I'll give Mr. Cantwell an opportunity to speak.

Okay? Everybody understand how we want to go ahead? Okay. So let's start with the overrepresentation of criminal history category argument. I've read your papers. I think I understand your arguments, but if you want to add

anything to them, feel free to do that.

MR. WOLPIN: Yes, your Honor. Our argument stems from the fact that obviously we have a point based system that does its best to approximate prior past behavior through certain variables like length of sentence. As discussed in what we filed, that gets I think more complicated in a time served scenario, because it becomes less evident that the sentence length imposed is truly a proxy for the seriousness of the offense.

In this case there was a situation where Chris appeared in court, left that day and left the state as required, and that was simply the end of it.

Whether a court in another sort of hypothetical world where he was not held pretrial that appeared with no days or ten days or five days or whatever it might have been would have similarly reached a sentence as here, it is unclear.

THE COURT: Let's make this concrete, okay? So let's start with -- which of the convictions are you arguing aren't really dealt with in a way that's consistent with the underlying purposes of the sentencing statute, and let's take them one at a time and identify what points are assessed and why you think those points produce overrepresentation.

MR. WOLPIN: Yes. All right.

So the points that are scored in this case only

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    come from two incidents or two sets of conviction.
                                                         The first
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    is a 2009, and I'm on page 15 of the PSR.
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               THE COURT: Got it. Paragraph 61?
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct.
 5
               And then paragraph 62, which is two points from a
    2017/2018.
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 7
                In this situation -- this argument focuses on the
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    last --
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                THE COURT: So he gets one point based on 61 and
    gets two points based on 62, but then he gets another two
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    points because of the supervision essentially that adds to
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    this offense while on supervision.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct.
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                THE COURT: All right. And so what do you want to
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    say as to 61?
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               MR. WOLPIN: So as to 61, this becomes a question
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    of date.
              It falls really right at that relatively arbitrary
18
    ten-year mark. So I understand there needs to be arbitrary
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    rules and timing and that is not illogical. However, it does
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    lead to circumstances where if one has committed something
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    just a couple months before, it would count as zero as opposed
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    to one.
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                THE COURT: So what we're talking about is the
    equivalent of a DUI charge?
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct.
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               THE COURT: And that was in 2009 and he was
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    assessed one point for that.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct.
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               THE COURT: If the charge had occurred how much
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    earlier would it be zero?
               MR. WOLPIN: Well, our argument would be this
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    offense begins in June, ends in June of 2019. So this would
    have been March. So if this -- the conduct, your Honor, in
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    our position predates the ten-year mark. The conviction for
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    whatever reason took 16 months or so to actually be entered.
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               So had this case simply resolved in a more
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    expeditious manner, our argument is this would have counted as
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    zero.
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               THE COURT: All right. So your view is if it's
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    close to the ten-year cutoff, it meets it technically but not
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    practically because the conduct that gave rise to conviction
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    well predates the ten-year period and it seems to be just a
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    delay in processing the case which results in the conviction
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    being within the ten-year period and the one point therefore
    is excessive.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Fair. Yes.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Got it.
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               What do you want to say? Do you agree that two
    points is warranted based on 62?
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct. So how that sentence was
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imposed, it imposed greater than 60 days of jail time.
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    case began as a number of felonies, ultimately resolved as
    misdemeanor offenses with time served resolutions.
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                THE COURT: These are the Charlottesville -- one of
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 5
    the Charlottesville convictions?
               MR. WOLPIN: There are two together that are
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 7
    misdemeanors charged from the same incident.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. WOLPIN: And --
                THE COURT: He gets points for one but not the
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    other because they occurred on the same day.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Because it's all the same, yes.
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    ultimately is.
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                THE COURT: The government points out he assaulted
    two different people, each one resulted in a conviction, but
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    they don't count -- you don't double count the points. You
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    just get two for that.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct. And my understanding of what
    these allegations were, it's a single spray of OC spray.
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    There were two people that were named as being sort of
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    affected by that and that's why there are two charges. So it
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    truly is the same act even though there ended up being two
    convictions.
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                THE COURT: Well, yeah, they are two distinct
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    victims -- you're saying that -- are you making the contention
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    that it was a single spray that hit two people?
               MR. WOLPIN: That's my understanding of the facts
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 3
    of that case, correct.
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               THE COURT: Okay. All right. Got you.
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               MR. WOLPIN: So from our position -- again, I
    understand why when this case started as a felony there may
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    have been, you know, a detention --
               THE COURT: Let me just go back to this single
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 9
    spray issue. Whether it was a single spray or not still would
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    only be two points for the two convictions, wouldn't it?
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               MR. WOLPIN: Yes.
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               THE COURT: So that point is like not determinative
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    of whether the two points is appropriate or not.
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               MR. WOLPIN: No.
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               THE COURT: Two points and only two points should
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    be assessed based on those two convictions under the quideline
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    whether it is a single spray or two distinct sprays that
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    occurred in close proximity to each other with no intervening
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    arrests, et cetera.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Okay. That's your position, but you
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    agree two points is the right assessment for that.
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               MR. WOLPIN: Correct.
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               THE COURT: Okay. So you have a problem with the
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    two points based on the commission of the offense -- I want to
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say under supervision. That's sort of a traditional way we 1 2 talk about it. What do you want to say about that? 3 MR. WOLPIN: I want to say that -- in relation to 4 this offense, yes. 5 So there was an unsupervised good behavior period which was imposed as part of a 2017 case. That ends up 6 7 causing what are misdemeanors to jump from what was originally two points to four points total for that offense. 8 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. I'm not 9 understanding you. What do you mean? 10 11 MR. WOLPIN: So it starts as two points as noted in 12 the, sort of within that section on paragraph 62. Then this 13 criminal justice sentence issue elevates that another two 14 points. So we're at a total ultimately of four points that 15 originate, I understand originates from the criminal justice 16 sentence provision but ultimately stems back from that. 17 THE COURT: Well, it comes from the fact that while he was under this period he committed the offenses of 18 19 conviction here, right? 20 MR. WOLPIN: Right. 21 THE COURT: So it's not like it changes a 22 misdemeanor to a felony. It doesn't do that at all. 23 basically if you're -- if you're being -- in the typical case 24 we have where you're being supervised -- if you commit a crime 25 while you're being supervised, you get extra points added on

1 because we need to be holding people who are supposed to be 2 under special supervision terms to a greater responsibility to avoid criminal conduct. And when they do it, it shows they're 3 4 not being rehabilitated by the prior sentence and therefore 5 justifies the imposition of more points. That's the way I 6 understand it works. Is that -- my thinking of it 7 incorrectly? 8 MR. WOLPIN: No. THE COURT: Okay. So that's what happened here, 9 and your point is that because he was not being formally 10 11 supervised by probation you think that it's improper to give 12 the two points. 13 MR. WOLPIN: I'm not arguing from a legal 14 standpoint that that is not what the guidelines call for. I'm 15 arguing from a consideration of how the points are being --16 reflecting the history, yes. I think that unsupervised 17 conditions of supervision or nonsupervision, just good 18 behavior, are so routine and commonplace, don't have that 19 rehabilitative function with supervision, that I think it 20 stretches beyond -- even though technically within the rule it 21 stretches beyond two points and sort of ends up having a 22 significant impact beyond what I think that good behavior 23 period should reflect. 24 THE COURT: Okay. I understand your argument. 25 Basically then you're saying treat -- don't treat -- don't

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give him one, effectively give him one for what happened with the DUI of ten years ago. Don't give him two. And if he's left with that, he only has two points so he would be a II rather than a III, right? That's your position? MR. WOLPIN: Yes. THE COURT: And did you want to say anything else about that? MR. WOLPIN: No, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. What does the government want to say in response? MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, the standard is whether a Criminal History Category of III substantially overrepresents either the risk of recidivism or the seriousness of the history. As we argued, the defendant cannot meet that burden of showing substantial overrepresentation. He's got five criminal history points on this calculation. As we argue, there are seven criminal convictions that result in precisely zero criminal history points. Those are nonetheless convictions and they bear on the seriousness of his offense and certainly the seriousness of his criminal history, and the recent ones --THE COURT: The ones prior to 2009, the ones reflected in paragraphs 56 through 60 are offenses that occurred in 1997, 1998, and 2000, right?

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               MR. DAVIS:
                           Yes.
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                THE COURT: So they're a long time ago when he
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    was --
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               MR. DAVIS: They're old convictions, yes.
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                THE COURT:
                           They're old convictions for which he
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    served a total of 45 days -- or no, he also did 60 on the
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    criminal possession of a weapon.
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               MR. DAVIS:
                           Yes.
                THE COURT: So he did 60 on that and 45 days on the
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    operating under influence charge.
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               MR. DAVIS: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. DAVIS: And two of them, your Honor, are much
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    more recent. One of them is the -- one of the assaults and
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    batteries in Charlottesville.
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                THE COURT: Well, the defense agrees that he
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    deserves the two points for that.
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               MR. DAVIS: Right. But the point is there is
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    another one that's a zero that does not result in more points.
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                THE COURT: Yeah, but the guidelines specifically
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    think about why you should not give points for those -- the
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    fact that there are two convictions why the guidelines
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    shouldn't give points.
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               MR. DAVIS: Right.
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                THE COURT:
                           I don't have to accept his single spray
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argument to say, oh, it was -- he shouldn't get an extra two
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    points.
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               MR. DAVIS:
                           Right.
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                THE COURT: Like if it were two sprays separated by
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    half an hour during the course of this demonstration, it would
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    still only be two points.
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               MR. DAVIS: Yes.
               THE COURT:
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                           Okav.
               MR. DAVIS: Although it's even closer because under
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    4A1.1(e), if the assault and battery in Virginia was a "crime
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    of violence," then another point would be added, and the issue
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    there is that --
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                THE COURT: Why doesn't it qualify as a crime of
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    violence?
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               MR. DAVIS: Because it's not categorically a crime
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    of violence I don't think, and we're not saying that it is,
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    but it's close. The only point being --
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                THE COURT: That's part of the fundamental
    misjudgment by the United States Supreme Court to use a
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    categorical approach which restricts the power of a judge to
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    actually look at what happened. I can't look at what happened
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    and say, oh, you should get points or not get points based on
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    what actually happened in the case. I have to look at the
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    offense of conviction, and you're saying this offense of
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    conviction is not categorically a crime of violence even
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though by its terms because it's an assault conviction you would think, oh, that's got to be a crime of violence, but it isn't and because we have to use this categorical approach I can't dig into the underlying circumstances.

MR. DAVIS: And I'm not arguing that you should, your Honor. I'm only saying this is a discretionary call on your part. The defendant is asking for a departure. The Court can assess anything and everything, and all the government is saying here is the defendant missed by a hair getting another point because that was almost a crime of violence.

The question is whether this criminal history score somehow substantially overrepresents his record or whether he'll recidivate, and we're just saying there are a lot of things here where he ekes out a no score.

We also argue the Charlottesville misdemeanors are not your ordinary misdemeanor. There's the Unite the Right rally. There are guys driving from New Hampshire with an armory of weapons, including guns and knives, who is in that march and is in a confrontation.

And, yes, he scrapes by with misdemeanor convictions, only one of which counts, but that's another consideration for the Court. Are these misdemeanors that are meaningless or are they misdemeanors that say something about criminal intent or the likelihood of more crimes?

1 THE COURT: All right. So you recognize that I 2 can't do that in determining how many points to assess. 3 MR. DAVIS: Correct, correct. 4 THE COURT: But you're saying I can do it and 5 should do it with respect to evaluating a request for a 6 departure. 7 MR. DAVIS: Yes. THE COURT: 8 Okav. 9 Do you have some argument that I am not permitted to do what the government says that he's asking me to do? 10 11 MR. WOLPIN: No. I do think it is a broader 12 consideration of his record is sort of the version the Court 13 is looking at. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 I mean, this is not a categorical MR. WOLPIN: 16 issue because these are misdemeanors and they're not crimes of 17 violence because the penalty doesn't exceed one year. So that 18 is not the sort of question that -- it would never have been a 19 crime of violence under the definition because they're just misdemeanor offenses. 20 21 I don't think the Court should be taking into 22 account the government's version of bringing guns. There was 23 nothing that this charge related to. There was no gun 24 involved. There was no gun ever alleged to be involved. 25 And so to sort of take that as some kind of bad

fact that changes the nature of the actual conviction and the actual conduct, I think that's unfair and that I would say is beyond the Court's consideration in looking at his record.

THE COURT: I think what he's saying is this two-point assessment is technically a two-point assessment, but it's actually -- when you look at what he actually did, it's worse than two points.

So when you are looking at other convictions and saying that's not as bad as the guidelines suggest, you should be able to consider that this particular conviction in the government's view is worse than what the point level suggests and therefore I should exercise my discretion to not depart downward.

To me what matters is he's close to the line between a II and III, and I'm looking at whether -- in my mind what weighs heavily when I decide on somebody's criminal history and I exercise discretion about it, it's how has that person been treated by the criminal justice system for the offenses.

So if people have not served substantial prison time for offenses, then that's a factor that weighs in my discretionary judgment as to when someone is close to the line whether he looks more like a II than a III. People who have been exposed to the criminal justice system and have received substantial prior sentences, in other words, where we try to

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    hold them to account and they still aren't deterred from their
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    criminal conduct, that's a reason to be cautious about
    granting a close-to-the-line horizontal departure.
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                Cases where someone may have accumulated a number
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    of convictions that technically move him from a II to a III
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    but who hasn't served substantial prison sentences, has had
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    less opportunity to have the ability of a sentence to deter
    him, to be tested. So that's a factor that weighs
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    significantly in my judgment on that.
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                Did you want to say -- I was interrupting you,
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              Did you want to go back and say anything more about
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    the criminal history category issues?
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               MR. DAVIS: I don't think so, Judge.
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                THE COURT: I've read your memorandum and I think I
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    understand your position.
16
                Okay. Let's turn to your issue. You point out
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    that the guidelines recognize that it can be an aggravating
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    factor in a threatening case if there's -- if a threat is
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    directed to a victim's family member as it was in this case.
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    I understand your point quite well. I did want to give the
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    defendant an opportunity to respond to it.
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                Did you want to say anything more about that?
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               MR. DAVIS: Only that we are not seeking an upward
24
    departure.
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                THE COURT: But it's an aggravating factor.
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1 MR. DAVIS: Sure. 2 THE COURT: That when I consider where to sentence 3 him within whatever range I land at, or when I consider 4 whether to vary downward, you're saying take that aggravating 5 factor into account, right? I think that's what you're 6 saying. 7 MR. DAVIS: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. It is what it is. It was a 8 threat against the victim's family. The guideline book 9 10 recognizes that is potentially an aggravating factor. He's 11 not arguing for an upward variance, but it is a factor that I 12 feel that I would be inclined to take into account in 13 sentencing unless you can convince me that it's not something 14 that I should consider at all here. 15 MR. WOLPIN: I would say it fits within the nature 16 and circumstances of the offense for sure. I think there are 17 some points to address around that issue, though. 18 THE COURT: You can do that -- if you want to do it 19 as a whole towards the end sort of like in this case 20 fortunately the victim's spouse was not informed of the 21 threat, so in that sense it wasn't quite as bad as it might 22 have been, you know, you can make those kind of totality of

threat, so in that sense it wasn't quite as bad as it might have been, you know, you can make those kind of totality of circumstances arguments later. But again, it is what it is.

It's a potential aggravating factor. It's something I'm inclined to take into account. Legally you're not telling me

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I can't do that. You're saying consider it in the context of the entire case, Judge, and it won't be as big a factor as the government says it should be.

MR. WOLPIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: Got it. Okay. Now let's get to the issue that I'm most confused about and maybe you can easily — it seems that you disagree fundamentally about what precipitated the criminal conduct by the defendant in this case.

Your position is, as I understand it, this was a long-standing plan to get dox on Vic Mackey and the defendant had a long-standing plan to try to compel people to give him dox on Vic Mackey, and that on the day that the particular extortion and threats that occurred here occurred it was not the victim who provoked the defendant. It was the defendant who before the victim did anything had posted a picture of the defendant's family, where as I understand you seem to be taking the position that's not the sequencing of the events; that there was a decision by the victim to go on to the Telegram site that the defendant was involved in, and that it was that action that precipitated publication of the blurred image and precipitated the discussion that you say led to an implied threat against Peach, the defendant's friend/wannabe girlfriend, and that that is what provoked the extreme criminal behavior by the defendant.

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So you think of it more as an extortionate plan that developed over a long period of time and that wasn't precipitated by some bad conduct by the victim, but that the immediate precipitating event was the victim happened to go on to a site he didn't know the defendant was associated with. The defendant had already posted an image of the victim's family. The victim tried to deescalate matters, and it was the defendant who was aggravating the situation and that prompted the Peach conversation. Do you agree your version seems to be in conflict with the defense version? MR. DAVIS: Yes, I think the spirit of it is. think we agree on a lot of facts but --THE COURT: But it does seem to disagree about when this first photo of the family was published. You say it occurred before the victim entered into the website that the defendant was affiliated with. MR. DAVIS: Right. THE COURT: The defense doesn't expressly say that's wrong but appears to describe an account that's inconsistent with the one you describe. So it is your contention, is it not, that the sequence -- what happened that day was, first, the picture, the blurred picture was published. Then the victim entered the site. Then the exchanges occurred. The victim tried to

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deescalate. The defendant refused to deescalate. Then they had the discussion where Peach was mentioned. defendant made the threats that led to his conviction. 3 Have I got your view of the sequencing right? MR. DAVIS: Yes. So the government doesn't know all of the facts -- it knows a few things. What it knows is 6 7 that the person known as Peach sent a message to Mr. Cantwell that's dated very early on June 15th of 2019, and what Peach is doing there is sending a query by someone else, it's not 9 clear who it is, but asking basically why did you take those 10 pictures of his family. And so it's clear that those pictures had been 13 People have seen them. People know that Peach was the person who was the source of those photos and people are 15 asking Peach questions. And again, the date of the screenshot 16 that Peach sends to Mr. Cantwell was very early on June 15th. 17 Now, is that screenshot accurate? Do the dates work out? Is there --19 THE COURT: I thought your memo did a pretty good 20 job of stating what I thought your version was. 21 So what you've alleged on page 3 of your memorandum 22 is that the defendant began a campaign to unmask Vic Mackey in 23 late February. MR. DAVIS: Correct. THE COURT: And you post something that the

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    defendant said, and then you say that in March he threatened
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    to dox the victim.
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               MR. DAVIS:
                           Directly, yes.
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                THE COURT: And said: When I do, it will all be
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    because of Vic.
                So you say this is a plan that is unfolding in
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    February and March.
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               MR. DAVIS:
                           Yes.
                THE COURT: And you provide what you say are
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    supportive postings that document that.
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               MR. DAVIS:
                            Correct.
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                THE COURT:
                           You allege that -- you acknowledge that
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    there was this extreme I would call it a trolling campaign
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    against Mr. Cantwell's site by the Bowl Patrol. They were
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    trying to disrupt his site during this period and that was
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    extraordinarily frustrating for him. I don't think you
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    dispute the fact that the victim was involved in some way in
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    that campaign. He was making calls.
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               MR. DAVIS:
                            Yes.
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                THE COURT:
                           But you allege that those calls had
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    largely ceased involving the victim and a substantial period
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    of time went by where there's no evidence that the trolling
    behavior involved the victim and there's no evidence that it
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    was continuing at the same clip for a significant period of
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    time.
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1 MR. DAVIS: Correct. 2 THE COURT: And so then we get to the dates in 3 question, which is in June, and what I understand your memo to 4 suggest is it was the defendant, not Mr. Lambert, who 5 commenced hostility. When first posted, the faces in the photos were apparently blurred. Part of the defendant's plan 6 7 to proceed incrementally with Mr. Lambert. The defendant admitted to publicly posting the photograph in his exchange 8 with Mr. Lambert the following day. 9 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 10 11 THE COURT: And that was all before Mr. Lambert 12 inadvertently went on to the site that Mr. Cantwell was 13 associated with. 14 MR. DAVIS: Well, the admission the defendant is 15 making is that in the course of the Telegram app 16 communications that are the subject matter of the case. 17 THE COURT: Yeah, but you're implying that the 18 posting predated --19 MR. DAVIS: Yes. But the posting itself -- because 20 of the Peach screenshot, the posting itself predated this 21 event. 22 THE COURT: Okay. And I do remember seeing 23 exhibits to that effect at the trial. I'm just asking you to 24 refresh my memory about exactly what your evidence is that 25 supports that contention.

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                           If I may, your Honor?
               MR. DAVIS:
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               THE COURT: Yeah. And I don't mind if both of you
           I'm more in the free-for-all category with these
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    things.
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               MR. DAVIS: Yes. Judge, it's in document 123-4 and
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    it starts with -- it's a screenshot. It says June 15th.
 7
               THE COURT: Yeah.
               MR. DAVIS: But the first time on it is 12:47 a.m.
 8
    So it's very early on June 15th if that is correct, and
 9
10
    there's also a time difference because Peach may well be in
11
    California at the time and there may be a three-hour
12
    difference.
13
               THE COURT: Would you read the exchange?
14
               MR. DAVIS: Yes. "Hello Katelyn. So why did you
15
    take pictures of those kids?"
16
               THE COURT: Okay. That's a communication to Peach
17
    from someone we don't know?
18
               MR. DAVIS: Correct.
19
               THE COURT: At a particular time?
20
               MR. DAVIS: Correct.
21
               THE COURT: And you're saying that's evidence of
22
    the fact that that image had been posted by that point?
               MR. DAVIS: Correct. And the defendant's statement
23
    to Cheddarman in the Telegram app confirms that because the
24
25
    defendant is the one who says: The next time they won't be
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1
    blurred.
 2
               THE COURT: Next time I post. Okay.
               MR. DAVIS: And it's all sort of -- the victim
 3
 4
    doesn't know what he's talking about at that moment, right?
 5
               THE COURT: Yeah.
               MR. DAVIS: And then when Mr. Cantwell provides --
 6
 7
               THE COURT: And then when does the victim log on to
    the site that Mr. Cantwell is associated with?
 8
 9
               MR. DAVIS: On the evening of June 15th.
               THE COURT: So the exchange with Peach telling us
10
11
    that the image had been posted by that point in your view
12
    occurred early in the morning on the 15th?
13
               MR. DAVIS:
                           Yes.
14
               THE COURT: And the entry into the Cantwell
15
    affiliated Telegram site did not occur until the next day.
16
               MR. DAVIS: Well, that same day. But, yes, the
17
    following evening, correct.
18
               THE COURT: In the evening of that day.
19
               MR. DAVIS: Yes.
20
               THE COURT: Okay. And then it was -- then when did
21
    Mr. Cantwell post: The next time I post that photo the faces
22
    won't be blurred, and then you'll be going to start getting
    unexpected visitors.
23
24
               When did he post that? That says 4:45 according to
25
    your --
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1 MR. DAVIS: He sent an unblurred photo as part of 2 the Telegram exchange. That's one of the photos that's part 3 of the Telegram exchange. So he actually showed it to the 4 victim as part of the Telegram exchange. 5 He also posted it on his own podcast or whatever 6 his group is called on the night of the 16th. 7 THE COURT: When did Mr. Cantwell first communicate with the victim about the fact that he had gone on the 8 9 Telegram app? 10 MR. DAVIS: At approximately 8:00 p.m. 11 first time on the Telegram app sequence. It's June 15th. 12 THE COURT: Yeah. 13 MR. DAVIS: So the whole sequence begins on the 14 evening of June 15th. I'm sorry, I'm not looking at the --15 I don't have all the exhibits in front THE COURT: 16 of me, but am I understanding your position is that what 17 happened is the blurred image was posted, someone communicated 18 with Peach about why the image was being posted, much later 19 that day the victim enters the Telegram site, and following 20 that the defendant initiates communication with the victim and 21 the victim tries to deescalate by saying, hey, I don't want 22 anything to do with you, essentially, and then what followed 23 were the communications where Mr. Cantwell refused to 24 acquiesce in that approach, and that led to the Peach comment 25 which led to Mr. Cantwell engaging in the criminal act?

1 That's the sequencing of what you think is what happened on 2 the 15th? 3 MR. DAVIS: Yes, as supplemented by Mr. Cantwell's 4 testimony at trial which did not fully explain the posting of 5 the photo but did acknowledge that he was having two 6 communications at once at various times with Peach, that he 7 was talking to Peach and he may well have been getting additional photographs or getting photographs ready to use as 8 part of his doxing campaign with the address of the victim. 9 10 So this whole chrono, your Honor, stems from the 11 date stamp on the screenshot that Peach sent to Mr. Cantwell 12 because that's what we have and it says June 15th, and then it 13 says 12:47 a.m. on June 15th. 14 But what seems clear beyond any doubt is that the 15 blurred photo had been posted by that time. If that time is 16 accurate, the blurred photo had been posted because someone is 17 reaching out to Peach and asking her about it and she's 18 involved enough and engaged enough that she's sending that to 19 Mr. Cantwell immediately. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So that's your view 20 21 about the sequencing of the event. 22 Let me just hear from the defense about what's 23 wrong with the sequencing of the --24 MR. WOLPIN: I do think there's a fundamental sort

of factual disagreement about the sequencing of the events.

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1
               It is correct that Peach sent this message to Chris
    that's attached to our sentencing memorandum that is from June
 2
    15th.
 3
 4
               There is no posting of a blurred photo --
 5
               THE COURT: What time is reflected as the posting
 6
    time?
 7
               MR. WOLPIN: Morning. Early morning on June 15th.
               THE COURT: All right. And you don't disagree that
 8
    the victim entered the Telegram site in the evening of the
 9
    15th?
10
11
               MR. WOLPIN: Correct.
12
               THE COURT: Okay.
13
               MR. WOLPIN: Later Cheddar Mane joins this chat
14
    group. It's Cheddar Mane's joining of the chat group that
15
    then prompts Chris to ask Peach for the photographs.
16
    photographs are then blurred. They are then posted -- our
17
    sequence does not involve blurred photographs being posted
18
    prior to the participation in this online chat between Cheddar
19
    Mane and Chris. That's the fundamental difference.
20
               THE COURT: You're saying that Peach and the
21
    defendant were communicating in the early morning of the 15th,
22
    but they weren't communicating about a blurred image and no
23
    blurred image had been posted as of that point?
24
               MR. WOLPIN: No. It was after joining the chat.
25
    As the government noted, there was back and forth that
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continued with Peach and Chris. At that point is when he got the photos, blurred them, they went up, and then there's a reference to them within the chat. So it is certainly our position that the 5 photographs were not --THE COURT: When do you say the defendant posted 7 the blurred image of the victim and his family? MR. WOLPIN: Once that Telegram -- again, I don't know the exact time, but once that Telegram interaction in 10 that chat group, or ultimately not a group but individual chat occurred, it followed from that, not before. THE COURT: Okay. So that seems to be a 13 fundamental difference between you. I know you argued otherwise at the time of the trial, that's my recollection at 15 least, about when that blurred photo was posted. You argued 16 that it was posted before the Telegram chat. That's my -- the 17 exchange about the Telegram entry.

If I'm misremembering that, you'll tell me, but you had a sequence of exhibits that purported to support your view of the timeline. Those exhibits should be still available to You should still be able to get them and walk me through them so that I can see the actual documents.

Well, let's be clear. Why is this relevant? is relevant because you agree -- you acknowledge that the sentencing quidelines recognize that provocation in a case

1 like this under certain circumstances can be a basis for a 2 downward variance, right? 3 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Okay. So you understand they're 5 asserting my client was provoked and you should vary downward because he was provoked. And your response to that argument 6 7 is to say, this wasn't provocation, Judge. This was a long-standing plan that the defendant developed months before 8 he committed the criminal acts to use threats to extort the 9 10 victim to give him dox on Vic Mackey. And even on the day in 11 question it wasn't the victim who provoked, it was Mr. 12 Cantwell who was provoking by putting out that blurred image. 13 That's your argument, isn't it? 14 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So I just want to be sure 16 factually, if you can support that, that I know exactly what 17 the sequence of evidence is. 18 You say, he's got the facts wrong, Judge. 19 not what happened. There wasn't a long-standing plan to 20 There was frustration, and, yes, he wanted Vic 21 Mackey's information, and, yes, he was mad at the victim, and 22 he thought Vic Mackey was leading the Bowl Patrol and that's 23 all he was saying in those early communications, and this 24 wasn't a plan -- a long-standing plan to extort by threat 25 information. The defendant lost it, Judge, when his wannabe

girlfriend, Peach, was impliedly threatened, and that made him 1 2 go over the line. That's what you're saying happened, right? 3 4 MR. WOLPIN: Yes. 5 THE COURT: And those are two very different takes on the case because you would agree, would you not, that 6 7 provocation is less compelling as a justification for a variance if the provocative act occurred months in the past, 8 the defendant waits months and months and months and then 9 10 claims provocation when he acts improperly, and it's also not 11 appropriate to use provocation as a downward variance where 12 the defendant engages in a conduct that produces a response 13 that causes the defendant to be provoked. 14 So understanding what's really happening with these 15 facts is important insofar as it bears on your argument for a 16 downward variance based on provocation. That's why I'm 17 asking -- it may sound like, why is the Judge getting bogged 18 down on these little details? Because you're each telling a 19 different story factually, so I need to know which one to 20 believe. 21 MR. WOLPIN: Your Honor, if I might, I hate to do 22 this, ask for a brief break. I would like to take a look back 23 at some paperwork that we have in relation to this and make

THE COURT: I would like the government to come

24

25

sure that we're --

forward with its exhibits and walk me through and show me sequentially why it is the government thinks the defendant's characterization of the case is wrong, and if you have evidence to support your characterization of the case, I'd like to see it. Because my recollection is that this was an issue between you even during the trial that neither of you focused on in great depth, but it was something that I was aware of during the trial that you seem to have different views about the sequencing of the relevant events here. And because you're raising a provocation variance, it's important for me to do the best I can and try to make sense of that evidence when I evaluate your provocation variance.

MR. DAVIS: The only thing I would say about that, Judge, is I don't think there's any disagreement, though, that the posting of blurred photos occurred prior to -- if the provocation is, I guess Peach took those photos, I guess you don't care what happens to her, so that's an event. That's something said in the Telegram messages. The Court has seen that. We can show you that.

But there's no doubt that before that was said, this defendant placed in a place where the public could see it blurred photos of the victim's wife and family and people did see it and people did communicate with Peach and he's on the phone with Peach while this is happening and --

THE COURT: Let me try to tell you what I think the

defense is saying here, okay?

MR. DAVIS: Okay.

THE COURT: What I think the defense is saying is what happened here was these guys embarked on a group effort to destroy my means of making a living and that made me really mad and I wanted it to stop, and I tried all means available to me to get it to stop, and these people, including the victim, persisted.

What happened on June 15th that set me off was I found the victim lurking at one of my Telegram sites and that pissed me off and I posted a blurred image. So it was, the immediate precipitating event was started by the victim and not me. He came on to my site. I posted a blurred image. We then had the exchanges we had. During that exchange I threatened. He tried to deescalate. I wouldn't accept the deescalation. He made a comment about Peach. I took that to be a threat to Peach. That made me really angry. I flipped out, lost control, and made threats that turned out to be criminal. And that's exactly the kind of provocation that the guidelines say a judge should take into account.

You say it worked very differently. You say he had a long-term plan to extort members of the Bowl Patrol to give up Vic Mackey. He focused on the defendant as a way to do that. Months go by. He has an opportunity to do it again. He posts an image, a blurred image of the victim's family to

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try to again threaten the victim to get him to give up Vic
Mackey. He then contacts the victim and they have the
exchanges that they have. The contents of which are not in
dispute.
           So your view is it was a preexisting plan. Your
view is immediate precipitating events on June 15th were
started by the defendant, not the victim, and those are
important facts that should affect your judgment about whether
there was any provocation here, right? Isn't that what you're
saying?
          MR. DAVIS: Except that we also don't agree that
wandering into the chat group and whatever the victim did was
provocation at all under 5K2.10. It was an annoyance, it was
irritating, but the guideline talks about --
           THE COURT: I'm not saying that the defendant's
version of facts is true, that he's entitled to a variance.
I'm just saying a judge should try to determine what the
actual facts are to the extent the judge can before the judge
makes a judgment about how to exercise discretion to consider
a concept like provocation.
          MR. DAVIS: Right.
                      I just want to get the factual record
           THE COURT:
straight.
                      So the record is this man had a real
          MR. DAVIS:
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beef with the Bowl Patrol. He wanted to dox Vic Mackey.

1 THE COURT: All right. That much is undisputed. MR. DAVIS: He said that he would dox other Bowl 2 Patrol members when he could, and he posted that in February 3 4 or March of 2019. He did then dox Mosin-Nagant at the end of 5 February of 2019 and got him out. Then on March 17th of 2019 6 7 THE COURT: I get all of that. You make the -wait. You make the following statement: It was the 8 defendant, not Mr. Lambert, who commenced hostilities on the 9 15th. 10 11 He says it wasn't the defendant who commenced 12 hostilities on the 15th. 13 MR. DAVIS: Then why does the screenshot from Peach say June 15th, 12:47 a.m.? 14 15 THE COURT: I want you to make your record. 16 don't have to just take your word for it. You've got all 17 these exhibits. If you went back and refreshed your memory 18 about how you proceeded at trial, you should be able to say 19 here's our view, Judge, here are the following five exhibits. 20 Let me produce copies of them. You can read them. Draw your 21 own conclusions, Judge. That's all I'm saying. You should be 22 able to do that. It's not an unreasonable request. 23 And apparently the defendant wants an opportunity to take a short break and marshal its evidence just so I can 24 25 make the record. I'm not saying even if everything the

defendant says is true that I would grant a variance, okay?

I'm just saying I've got to do my job here, which is make sure

I understand the factual record as best I can before I make an important decision. That's all I'm asking.

I mean, are you willing to do that if I give you a fifteen-minute break to come back and -- with your exhibits and you can look at the trial exhibits, they're all there, and say here are the relevant ones, Judge, and here's how we interpret them. If you have other exhibits, you can say here are the relevant ones, Judge, here's how we interpret them. I will then have the record and I'll make my best judgment. That's all I'm asking.

MR. DAVIS: That's fine, your Honor.

Just one other thing, Judge. On the sentencing memo, page 9, of the defendant, Mr. Cantwell, it says: In June of 2019, the day prior to the online encounter at the heart of this case, Christopher's ex-girlfriend known as Peach forwarded Christopher an electronic communication she had received, Exhibit D. Christopher understood this communication, so why did you take picture of those kids, to reference photographs that Peach took of Cheddar Mane's children in the fall of 2018.

The defendant's own pleading acknowledges that the day before June 15th Mr. Cantwell gets a text message or a screenshot from Peach, and what he knows is going on is there

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are photos posted of the victim's family, his wife and
 1
 2
    children, and Peach is getting questions about it.
 3
    what he says.
 4
                THE COURT: All you've got to do is make some
 5
    photocopies of a few documents, put them in the right
 6
    sequence, and hand them to me and say, look at this, Judge.
 7
    Start with this one and then go to that one, and you'll see
 8
    the actual evidence that supports what I'm saying.
 9
                Is that too much to ask of you?
10
               MR. DAVIS: It is not, Judge.
11
               THE COURT: All right. Good.
12
               And you'll do it from your perspective.
13
               We'll take a short break. When you're ready, we'll
14
    come back and finish this thing.
15
                I just want to understand each party's position and
16
    the evidence supporting it so that I can make my own judgment
17
    about it. I mean, I'm making an important decision that
18
    affects a person's life. I want to be sure I do it on the
19
    best possible record I can with as little misunderstanding as
    possible. That's all I'm trying to do.
20
21
                (RECESS)
22
                THE COURT: So take me through the documents, what
23
    story they tell you from your perspective. I'll hear from the
24
    defense after.
25
               MR. DAVIS: We request permission to use the ELMO.
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1
               THE COURT: Go ahead. Do we need to turn it on?
 2
    Is it on?
 3
               THE CLERK: Yes.
 4
               MS. KRASINSKI: Your Honor, defense provided us a
 5
    copy of the broader communications between Peach and the
 6
    defendant and not just that screenshot, so what I'm going to
 7
    attempt to do is present a very neutral time frame with that
 8
    new document. I only have the one copy.
 9
               THE COURT: Was this an exhibit at trial?
               MS. KRASINSKI: It was not, your Honor.
10
11
               THE COURT: Okay.
12
               MS. KRASINSKI: It's something we just received
13
    today.
14
               THE COURT: Okay.
15
               MS. KRASINSKI: So I'd ask permission to mark that
16
    as Government's Exhibit 1.
17
               THE COURT: All right. Are you going to refer to
18
    any other documents?
19
               MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor. I e-mailed a copy
20
    to the deputy clerk, but I also have printed copies.
21
               THE COURT: Okay. Great. You can hand me the
22
    printed copies.
23
               Are other documents being referred to by their
    trial exhibit number or are we going to mark them separately?
24
25
               MS. KRASINSKI: My plan was to refer to them by
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1
    their trial exhibit number, your Honor.
 2
               THE COURT: All right. That's fine. Except for
    the one document that's new that we're marking. Go ahead.
 3
 4
               MS. KRASINSKI: So, your Honor, Defense Exhibit
 5
    B-20 indicates that on March 17, 2019, the defendant first
    threatened to dox Mr. Lambert: Stay the fuck away from me and
 6
 7
    my platforms or I'll dox your stupid ass.
               THE COURT: This is Defendant's B-20?
 8
               MS. KRASINSKI: Correct, your Honor.
 9
               And later in that conversation is where the
10
11
    defendant says: When you get doxed, it's all because of Vic.
12
    Remember that.
13
               THE COURT: Got it.
14
               MS. KRASINSKI: Now, in some time of March 2019 the
15
    defendant posted: I have dox on several of these Bowl Patrol
16
    idiots and I'm gonna -- we assume that says start -- st
17
    dropping them until they rat out Vic.
18
               And this is Government's Exhibit 304.
19
               THE COURT: The date on that again?
20
               MS. KRASINSKI: So the date comes from Government's
21
    Exhibit 300 from the computer -- the forensic extraction of
22
    the defendant's computer. And March 17, 2019, is the date
23
    that the screenshot of Government's Exhibit 304, the I have
24
    dox post, was saved on the defendant's computer.
25
               THE COURT: Okay.
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MS. KRASINSKI: So this is where the defendant's
 1
 2
    new exhibit comes into play.
               Defense Exhibit B-15 is what we've sort of all been
 3
 4
    looking at before, this message that Peach sent to the
 5
    defendant on June 15th that the defendant says in his
    sentencing memo that he understood to be referring to pictures
 6
 7
    of Mr. Lambert's family.
               THE COURT: We don't know who is communicating with
 8
    Katelyn on this?
 9
10
               MS. KRASINSKI: That's correct. At trial the
11
    defense asked Mr. Lambert if it was Mr. Lambert. He said no.
12
    Other than that, there's no evidence of who sent these
13
    messages to Katelyn.
14
               THE COURT: And that appears to be 12:47 a.m., and
    we don't know who sent them so we don't know -- that would be
15
16
    the time or the place where the document is posted?
17
               MS. KRASINSKI: These were messages received on
18
    Katelyn's phone, so it would be the time that she received the
19
    message -- or, well, she took the screenshot, but the time of
20
    hello Katelyn would be the time she received the message.
21
    believe she resides in California, so that would be the time
22
    in California.
23
               THE COURT: Okay. Good.
24
               MS. KRASINSKI: Okay. So we have always assumed
25
    that because the defendant understood this very early June
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1
    15th message to be referring to pictures of Mrs. Lambert's
 2
    children that no one could send a message to Katelyn about
 3
    that photograph --
 4
                THE COURT: Unless it had been posted.
 5
               MS. KRASINSKI:
                               Exactly.
                            So that was an assumption you made
 6
                THE COURT:
 7
    based on the fact that someone is communicating with Katelyn
    about what you thought was an image, and it's a reasonable
 8
 9
    assumption therefore that the image was available in some way
10
    over the Internet.
11
               MS. KRASINSKI: Correct, your Honor.
12
                THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
13
               MS. KRASINSKI: So this is Government's Exhibit 1,
14
    the communications that defense provided us, sort of the more
15
    complete communications between Katelyn and the defendant, and
16
    that frankly changes this a bit.
17
                THE COURT: All right.
18
               MS. KRASINSKI: So, again, it shows on June 15th
19
    that Katelyn sent the defendant the screenshots we just looked
    at from Defense Exhibit B-15. But then it also shows the
20
21
    defendant's reaction and so --
22
                THE COURT: Is this from the defendant's phone?
               MS. KRASINSKI: As I understand it as it was
23
24
    represented to me, Katelyn provided these screenshots to
25
    defense counsel.
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1
                THE COURT: So this is Katelyn's phone?
 2
               MS. KRASINSKI: That's my understanding.
 3
                THE WITNESS: Screenshots that Katelyn took from
 4
    her phone?
 5
               MR. WOLPIN: Yes.
                THE COURT: Okay. And they were provided to
 6
 7
    defense counsel and not the government.
 8
               MS. KRASINSKI: Correct, your Honor.
               THE COURT: The government didn't have these?
 9
10
               MS. KRASINSKI: We just received these during this
11
    hearing, your Honor.
12
                THE COURT: All right.
13
               MS. KRASINSKI: So the defendant responds that he
14
    doesn't know, but he doubts that the person who sent those
    messages was Mr. Lambert.
15
16
                THE COURT: Okay.
17
               MS. KRASINSKI: And Mr. Cantwell says, I have not
18
    leaked that photo and the photo in question has not been
19
    published, and then --
20
                THE COURT: So the defendant is denying that he
21
    posted it.
22
               MS. KRASINSKI: And as you read this, it becomes
23
    sort of clear that they're talking about different
24
    photographs, that the defendant is talking about a photograph
25
    of Katelyn with Ben Lambert and one other individual when they
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1
    were all hanging out together at the Lambert's house.
 2
                So that conversation began at 2:56 a.m. on June
 3
    15th. Again, since this is from Katelyn's phone, that would
 4
    be in California.
 5
                Later in that conversation, so at 7:51 p.m., the
    defendant says, give me the address and those pictures, and
 6
 7
    she sends him images of the defendant's family and address
    information.
 8
 9
               And so that is at 7:51 p.m. there, which is
    approximately 10:00 p.m. here.
10
11
                THE COURT: Okay.
12
               MS. KRASINSKI: On June 15th.
13
               THE COURT: All right.
14
               MS. KRASINSKI: So now we go to Government's
15
    Exhibit 100, which is the communication between the defendant
16
    and the victim, and at 9:00 p.m. is when the defendant first
17
    sends a message to the victim, and at 9:29 p.m. before he asks
18
    for the address information from Katelyn, he sends a message
19
    to the victim with his street address.
20
                THE COURT: Yep.
21
               MS. KRASINSKI: Then -- and I should note that
22
    these times, the times on Government's Exhibit 100 are Eastern
23
    Time.
24
                THE COURT: Okay. So we're looking at the
25
    defendant's phone, the screenshots?
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1
               MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor.
               THE COURT: All right.
 2
               MS. KRASINSKI: Then they communicate. At 2:13
 3
 4
    p.m. the victim tries to deescalate, and the defendant
 5
    responds at 4:45 p.m.: Next time I post that photo, the faces
    won't be blurred, and then you're going to start getting
 6
 7
    unexpected visitors.
               THE COURT: Is that -- do you contend now that
 8
    that's when that photo was published?
 9
10
               MS. KRASINSKI: At some point before 4:45 p.m. the
11
    blurred photo would have been published.
12
               THE COURT: And the entry into the Telegram account
13
    was when?
14
               MS. KRASINSKI: So the entry into the Telegram
15
    account that we have is when he posts the unredacted versions.
16
               And I want to be clear. No one has been able to
17
    recover a copy of the redacted version that he posted so
18
    that's why we don't have that date and time information.
19
               THE COURT: But you know it was posted by 4:45 p.m.
20
    Eastern Standard Time?
21
               MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor.
22
               THE COURT: On the 15th?
23
               MS. KRASINSKI: On the 16th, your Honor.
24
               If we go back to the first page of Government's
25
    Exhibit 100, you see that the date -- it rolls -- the
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1 conversation rolls from the 15th to the 16th. 2 THE COURT: When did the victim join, what is it, 3 the I Like White People account or --4 MS. KRASINSKI: Peaceful White Folk. 5 THE COURT: The Peaceful White Folk account, when 6 did the victim enter that? 7 MS. KRASINSKI: The testimony from both the defendant and the victim was consistent on that, that it was 8 essentially immediately before this 9:00 p.m. message. 9 10 So the victim entered Peaceful White Folk. I think 11 his words were he posted a Heimbach meme, and then he was --12 the defendant kicked him out of the chat. 13 THE COURT: So my confusion about this stems from 14 your incomplete information about it and the inferences you 15 drew from it. And now that we have seen the full chain, the 16 government understands better the sequencing of events, and I 17 understand now the government agrees that the sequencing is such that the victim entered the Peaceful White Folk account 18 19 before any pictures were posted of the victim's family and the 20 sequencing of events is otherwise as they are represented in 21 the exhibits that were contributed to the trial. Is that fair 22 to say? 23 MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: So we're now at a point where there's 25 no fundamental disagreement between the defense and the

1 government as to the historic facts that lay out the timeline 2 about what the defendant said about the Bowl Patrol people, when the victim entered the Peaceful White Folk account, and 3 4 all of the exchanges between the defendant and the victim that 5 followed that were captured and produced at trial in the way 6 we understood them to be. 7 So we have resolved that point of confusion. Ιs 8 that fair to say? 9 MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: And from your perspective, you don't 11 have any disagreement with the defense as to the historic 12 facts. You disagree about what inferences should be drawn 13 from them and what significance to attach to them, but the 14 factual record is now undisputed? 15 MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor. 16 There's one other historical fact that I would just 17 like to point out and that's from Defense Exhibit I think it's 18 I2A, the I series, and this is the defense exhibit showing the 19 victim's call-ins to the defendant's show. And the final page 20 of that shows that there were no calls from the victim --21 attributable to the victim after February 15, 2019, until 22 after this incident. 23 Okay. Good. Thank you. That was a THE COURT: point of confusion in my mind at the trial and it wasn't 24 25 important to me because I wasn't a fact finder and provocation

isn't a defense to the charge, and clearly the defense did not see any tactical advantage to them in disclosing the correct sequencing, and so now we've resolved that and I can better evaluate the parties' arguments with respect to the provocation defense here.

Does the defense want to respond to anything you've heard at this point?

MR. WOLPIN: No. I think the fundamental sort of timing question that was at issue with the Court has been resolved. I just note it is consistent as well. I mean, the government did review Chris's phone in relation to this investigation and did ultimately produce a timeline. That timeline shows these photos that we've been talking about coming on to the phone on the 16th, which is consistent with that these were not sort of had for a long period of time or had days before or something like that.

THE COURT: All of that makes more sense to me.

MR. WOLPIN: Yes.

THE COURT: From the very beginning that was a point of dissidence in my mind because trying to put the evidence in the case together logically, there doesn't even appear to be a motivating force for the timing of the release of the blurred image other than entry into the Peaceful White Folk account and therefore would follow logically that it would happen afterwards. To the extent the government was

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suggesting in pleadings with me that that was not the case, there's a dissidence here and it wasn't making a lot of sense to me and I wanted to try to resolve it. MR. WOLPIN: Thank you. MS. KRASINSKI: Your Honor, one procedural thing. May I move that the public version of Government's Exhibit 1 be redacted with the photographs of the minor children redacted? THE COURT: Yes. So in terms of what would be available to the public, we aren't going to disclose the images of the minor children. MS. KRASINSKI: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So this took longer than I hoped, I apologize, but I need to be -- when I'm confused about something, it makes me nervous because I make decisions that affect people's lives and I don't want to be confused. We've now resolved that point of confusion. ready to hear the defense -- the government's recommendation and anything you want to say about sentencing. I'll then hear from the defense. Please keep in mind, as you know, I studied very carefully your memoranda. You provided me very detailed and helpful memoranda, so you don't need to repeat what's in there. I think I understand it. So what would the government like to say about your

recommendation and anything you would like to say in support?

MS. KRASINSKI: Your Honor, the government opposes the request for a variance and departure and recommends a high end of the guideline sentence of 51 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.

The defendant committed two very serious crimes less than a year after he pled guilty to two assault and battery crimes in Virginia and was still subject to the sentences for those offenses. He began his campaign against Mr. Lambert with the goal of obtaining Mr. Vic Mackey's identity and exposing Vic Mackey to the world and everything that doxing entails.

It was in this pursuit of Vic Mackey's identification that the defendant made repeated threats of physical and psychological violence. And I view a threat to rape a mother in front of her children as a threat to commit psychological violence against those children to witness that, and so that is a part of the threat here.

The context of the threats matter, because at the time the defendant made them it was public knowledge that he had traveled from New Hampshire to Virginia armed with firearms, knives, and it was public knowledge that he didn't hesitate to use pepper spray on counter protesters and was convicted of offenses related to that.

It was public knowledge by that point that the

defendant had made statements that he was trying to make himself more capable of violence. And the defendant acknowledges that he had a platform. He had listeners. He had followers. And so that context matters because he invoked his followers, his Incel listeners, in part of this campaign to threaten and extort Mr. Lambert.

And to me it's magnified because as a recipient of a threat like this, you don't know what to look out for. You don't know if you're waiting for Mr. Cantwell to show up at your door. You don't know if you're looking for some unidentified listener to show up at your door.

THE COURT: I'm inclined to agree with all of that. Let me ask you a question that I have struggled with, and I'm interested in your answer to this.

Would it have made any difference to you if Mr.

Cantwell had engaged in his -- the identical behavior with a member of the public with whom he had had none of the prior interactions that he had with the victim in this case? I understand your position that provocation shouldn't be a basis for a variance, but is there anything about the nature of the interaction between the two of them that differentiates the outcome in this case from a case in which Mr. Cantwell learned that a member of the instant messenger company that had the messages knew Vic Mackey's address and he contacted that person cold and threatened to rape his wife in front of their

children? Are these two cases, would they be -- all other things being equal, should they be sentenced identically, or is there something about the nature with the interactions that preceded these threats, although in your view not amounting to provocation, nevertheless should affect the outcome?

Because at least there would be an argument, I think the defendants allude to this, that these people have exchanged such incredibly offensive and violent conduct on a routine basis that would shock the ordinary person and that in effect they had become through their interactions with each other desensitized to their extraordinarily horrendously violent nature of the exchanges between the two of them.

So answer my question about are those two cases, should they be sentenced identically, in other words, there should be no consequence, no evaluation of the interaction between the two people that preceded the defendant's criminal conduct, is it just the came as if he had called up an employee at a company who had nothing to do with any interaction with the defendant and made these threats?

MS. KRASINSKI: So to me, in answering your question what I look at is the fact that the victim himself had stopped harassing Mr. Cantwell for months before this exchange.

Had Mr. Lambert --

THE COURT: It's not just that. I'm talking about

how two people who have a pattern of interacting with each other in extraordinarily offensive and violent ways become desensitized to the very nature of their communications and so the effect on victim is different. Is there an argument to be made here, and what's your response to it?

MS. KRASINSKI: I think even in this community that spits vitriol and disgusting views, even in this community there is a line, and I think that line is underscored by the fact that the defendant viewed this language, so I'm assuming Peach took that picture, guess that means you don't care what happens to her either, that the defendant viewed a comment that innocuous about a partner to be so offensive that he claims that that's what spurned this whole thing, that that shows that his following statement, so if you don't want me to come and fuck your wife in front of your kids, then you should make yourself scarce, is way over the line even in this community that says disgusting things about Jews and about black people.

THE COURT: I don't agree with you at all about that. It's not a question of whether it's criminal and over the line warranting punishment. It's a question of would I sentence those two cases in exactly the same way. Because I think if you are here in front of me with the hypothetical case that I've given you, you would be saying to me this is not a person who lives and interacts in this community where

people spew violence on a daily basis, that spew hatred on a daily basis. This is a person that, like all the rest of us that live in society where that kind of conduct is so shocking that it's almost inconceivable, and the harm to a victim who is subjected to that kind of threat in that kind of environment is so extraordinary that it warrants a gigantic upward departure. I think that's the argument you would be making to me. If I'm wrong about that, tell me.

So I'm just trying to figure out do you really sentence those two cases identically. I think there's a good argument that they shouldn't be sentenced identically. That doesn't mean that the defendant's sentence in this case should be nothing. It just means that context matters when you try to evaluate and make a sentencing judgment. That's all.

MS. KRASINSKI: No, I agree that context matters, and it has been a very difficult deep dive into a world that I was never a part of. But from my deep dive, even in this world where people spew violence and hatred, making a comment about someone's partner, about someone's children, is outside of the norm of even that.

THE COURT: I don't disagree with you on that. I understand what you're saying.

MS. KRASINSKI: And I want to address something else that the defendant raises, and that is sort of that unmasking white supremacist who posts this vitriol under a

pseudonym is some sort of social good, because that's another one of his arguments for a downward variance.

But he didn't dox Mr. Lambert out of some sense of moral obligation and -- you know, this case isn't about whether it's a good thing.

THE COURT: I'm unlikely to credit the defendant with some kind of altruistic act if that's what you're suggesting. That's not a high likelihood.

MS. KRASINSKI: He also asks the Court to disregard, and the term he uses is the unpleasantries that Mr. Lambert has suffered as a result of being doxed. And the Court -- I mean, I don't think the Court should do that because it was exactly those unpleasantries that the defendant was invoking when he threatened to dox Mr. Lambert. I mean, that was what he was threatening to do.

And so I don't think the Court should disregard that. And, you know, he says, well, I only posted it to a few hundred people, but once information is online that's it, it's available for the world. The damage is done. I mean, any further dissemination of that was absolutely reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and whatever Mr. Lambert said online as Cheddar Mane, Cheddarman, or any of his other pseudonyms, you know, he sat on that stand and at the end of his testimony he talked about not being able to be a hockey dad. And I may disagree with all of the views he said under

his pseudonym, but that's a real consequence and I don't think the Court should disregard that.

And I also want to focus on the fact that, you know, we know at the time this was happening Mrs. Lambert was not aware of the threat, but I think in sentencing the defendant and in considering his motions for a departure and a variance that the Court should consider the very lasting implications for her and those children as well. Their photographs are in the public domain. Their address is in the public domain. They no longer have any control over the use or misuse of photographs of their children.

You know, the Court is well aware that once something is on the Internet it can be copied, it can be further disseminated. You don't know who has copied it. You don't know who they've shared it with. You can't measure the ripple effect. You can't find and delete every single copy.

He essentially gave hundreds of people the ability to further disseminate this very private information, and the truth is she knows about it now. I've met with her and frankly, you know, even now it's too painful for her to really want to participate.

And what the other sort of interesting part of this to me is, you know, the defendant testified that he regretted what he did, but even by the time of trial he never once took steps to mitigate that. Those photographs could have been

deleted long ago, at least his posting of them. The address information could have been deleted long ago.

Now, I get that that's, you know, closing the stable door after the horses have already bolted, but it would at least show some type of real regret for the actions he took, you know, some sort of attempt to mitigate the damage.

But when Attorney Davis and I were preparing for trial and meeting with Mr. Lambert, you know, that was sort of the one thing that really -- that Mr. Lambert really continued to struggle with, with this sort of online platform, is that the photographs, all that information was still up, it was still accessible. Someone in my opinion with true remorse, true regret for this exchange, for this conduct, would have at least taken some effort to mitigate the damage but never did.

So in sum, based on the history and circumstances of this offense, the defendant's history, the nature and circumstances of this offense, a sentence of 51 months of imprisonment would reflect the serious nature of Mr.

Cantwell's crimes, it would promote respect for the law, it would provide just punishment, it would afford adequate deterrence, and it would protect the public from future crimes of the defendant.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. I'll hear from the defense.

MR. WOLPIN: So this case is less about the what

and more about the why. I mean, ultimately the discovery we were provided has everything in writing. Much of what was presented at this trial was fixed in writing. And so there isn't a dispute at this point as to the what. But I do think the why, as the Court has alluded to, is an important consideration particularly for sentencing, and I make that argument because there's a spectrum of why. There is on one end completely unprovoked, the sort of model that the Court noted, and probably as far on the other end is self-defense, that the conduct leading up to it was egregious or sufficient to the point to make someone not even guilty of the offense. This in our opinion falls somewhere obviously in the middle of that spectrum.

It is not an unprovoked situation, it is not a self-defense situation, but it is a situation where context and why matter, and we are asking that the Court consider the 13 months that Christopher has already served in relation to pretrial time, which with sort of the nuances of federal good time is about a 15-month sentence with the good time credit as well as continued supervision upon his release.

Before talking a little more about the sort of context of this case, I do think it's worth addressing the context of other cases, and there is some of that in my motion and some of that in the government's response as to other cases charged similarly or with similar facts.

And to some degree it is somewhat difficult -
THE COURT: Yeah, there are a couple of things in

MR. WOLPIN: Okay.

your memoranda on that point that troubled me.

THE COURT: To the extent that you're implying that prosecutors don't often charge these kinds of offenses and therefore I should give the defendant a lighter sentence, again, I don't see that as part of the calculus that I should be engaging in when trying to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity. And to the extent you identify specific cases where you say the sentence was lower and the charges are comparable, and the government identifies cases that it says are comparable and the sentences are higher, that's an inquiry that rarely turns out to be useful in evaluating claims of unwarranted sentencing disparity.

What would be useful if you had it that you don't provide is -- if you could demonstrate that a very high percentage of certain kinds of cases are routinely the subject of downward departures and variance that are similar to this case, that would be useful.

And a good example of that is in the child pornography area where you well know there are certain kinds of enhancements that the guidelines call for that almost no judge gives. And when judges widely don't follow the guidelines, that is important information because if you're

the one judge who sticks with the guidelines, you may be promoting unwarranted sentencing disparity.

But the kind of information you provide me on that point does not cause me to think that the sentence should be other than a guideline sentence simply to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity. It's the kind of analysis that just is very rarely fruitful, but you can say what you want to say about it. I've read your memorandum.

MR. WOLPIN: The effort -- obviously with the less frequency or infrequency of this charge, it is harder to collect that data.

I do think that was addressed in the best way I could come up with, which was the tool through the guidelines itself, this analyzer tool, which allowed me to collect all 2B3.2 cases within our region and say, hey, what is going on in those cases broadly rather than saying this particular case had this fact and this fact. It's a broader data.

And when you look at 2B3.2 which is the guideline we're dealing with here, there were 13 cases in the time frame available through the data analyzer, which is 2015 to 2019, looking through New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, our sort of First Circuit neighbors, there were 13 cases noted in those circuits or in those districts over those five years. All of them were given below guideline sentences.

So from the perspective -- and that's attached as Exhibit I, I believe, and J, sort of what was pulled out of that tool.

So that I agree it can be tough to come in and say case X_{ℓ} case Y_{ℓ} here's the difference.

THE COURT: And especially when there's a very small subset of cases you analyze. That's why -- I find the argument persuasive in the context of child pornography where you could say 75 percent of the judges depart downward given these circumstances, and if you don't depart downward, there's no good reason to distinguish your decision from others. You're in fact promoting unwarranted sentencing disparity by sticking with the guideline.

That argument where it can be demonstrated is appealing. This one is harder to establish because you're using a very small subset of cases. To really evaluate it I would have to kind of undertake a detailed analysis of each of the cases that you are proposing. I would have to read the sentencing transcript to understand whether there was any cooperation and what the judge found about how accepting responsibility — in how many cases there was acceptance of responsibility credit given because the defendant pleaded guilty. There are just so many factors that really would have to be considered to prepare case A against case B, and I don't think that's what the drafters of the sentencing statutes were

after when they talked about avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity.

So I don't tend to give much weight to that argument. I certainly considered it to the extent you outlined it in your brief. I would suggest you find a more better use of your time on other aspects of your memorandum.

MR. WOLPIN: Okay. So to finalize or move on from that, and it directly relates to the circumstances of this case which I'm about to address, is I do think that what a lot of these charges are intended to address, including one cited by the government, are when there's commentary to public officials, there's an interference with government action. So we've had recent cases like that where there's a threat to a legislator, a threat to someone counting votes, that there's a broader need for deterrence and punishment where there is an effort to inhibit the effective administration of our government.

That is not the situation here. This is ultimately a dispute that is limited to a dispute between two individuals involved in a far longer running dispute, not something that has this broader impact of government operation.

The other cases I tend to see in reviewing this are sort of the sexting scenario where there's an effort to obtain, you know, naked photographs, many naked videos, and those are again similar cases cited that have another broader

deterrent-based interest. I think --

THE COURT: Yeah, I sentenced that case, and I can tell you the sentence was a lot longer than the sentence that he's being exposed to here. Those kind of cases -- I don't remember the sentence I gave, but if you went back and looked at it, you can see it's way, way higher than what we're talking about here.

MR. WOLPIN: I do think those are the kind of scenarios where general deterrence and punishment has to be at its utmost. I think when it's a private dispute, that is not the same situation where there's a -- I mean, not that there's not a need to punish and regulate that behavior but not to the same punitive extent as where there are broader public interests at work.

So getting back to our situation, you know, the government presented a timeline just now that incorporated some of our facts but obviously not all. It did come through the government's prism. We do think it's important for the Court to understand the context and why this came to be. And I know there is I think -- although we've resolved that factual dispute, I think there is some factual dispute as to what kind of role Cheddar Mane had in this process.

THE COURT: Yeah. So let's be clear. I am quite satisfied that during the period in February and March that there was a very -- a coordinated campaign by the members of

the Bowl Patrol, including the victim in this case, to harass Mr. Cantwell to attempt to disrupt his ability to earn a living off of his programs and it drove him crazy. That to me is -- that was established at the trial.

But there is an additional contention that the government is making that you may have evidence to refute that you want to bring to my attention, which is that that pattern of harassment had waned by June and in any event did not involve the victim in the case. I think the government is making that contention.

Have I got that wrong? Am I mischaracterizing your position?

MS. KRASINSKI: I don't know about the broader campaign. I think the evidence established that --

THE COURT: Your memorandum sort of suggested that the campaign had already fallen off at that time. If you're not contending that, that's fine. If they are contending that, then to the extent you want to refute that, you can, but I do think it is the government's contention clearly that the government asserts that the victim in this case was not an active participant in that campaign in the months immediately preceding the defendant's criminal conduct. And if you want to refute that, you can.

MR. WOLPIN: I'll refute that in the sense that the issue Christopher was dealing with from his end wasn't

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resolving. It wasn't diminishing. He was continuing to get
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    these kinds of actions.
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                What became more difficult for him to unpack was
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    who it was coming from because as was brought out to some
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    degree at trial, there became the use of spoofing software
    and, you know, phone companies that allowed you to do this and
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    that, and he spent a significant amount of time trying to make
    it stop from that end, but he was never certain who was the
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    person calling even when it was Cheddar Mane or not Cheddar
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    Mane.
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                THE COURT: I agree with that. That's consistent
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    with my understanding.
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               MR. WOLPIN: I mean, it's sort of the amorphous
    sort of conspiracy concept that you can't always tell where
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    it's coming from. And so for Christopher when this contact
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    came to him from Peach which -- and I know the government
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    addressed the one as well in the chat that is sort of
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    downplaying that, that language has an implicit malice built
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    in whether it's --
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                THE COURT: What are you talking about?
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               MR. WOLPIN: The June 15th contact to Ms. Peach
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    that has been provided.
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                THE COURT: The one we talked about just today you
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    mean?
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               MR. WOLPIN: Just today, correct.
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. WOLPIN: Which was then forwarded along to 3 Chris. 4 THE COURT: Doesn't that exchange show that Mr. Cantwell didn't think that came from Mr. Lambert? 5 MR. WOLPIN: Chris doesn't know who that comes from 6 7 at the time. I mean, he understands that --THE COURT: Well, you're not saying that -- I'm not 8 9 understanding you. 10 MR. WOLPIN: Okay. So Chris gets this from Peach 11 out of the blue. He understands that it's in reference, 12 because she explains it to him, to her visiting of Cheddar 13 Mane. He's aware that this has to have a sort of Cheddar Mane 14 nexus. Again, the same thing. He doesn't know who it's from, 15 he can't be certain, but it's on his mind. 16 And then the next day that person who sort of gets 17 involved shows up in his chat room and to him that's not a 18 coincidence. There is some, in his mind some pattern of 19 malice. It can't be proven, it's uncertain, but in 20 understanding provocation I think the Court does need to 21 consider what his view of what was happening was, and it 22 wasn't an unreasonable view in light of sort of the very 23 narrow subject matter of that text. 24 THE COURT: Do you contend that anything -- that 25 the victim -- anything the victim did while in the -- what is

1 it called, Peaceful White Folk or something? MR. WOLPIN: Yes. 2 3 THE COURT: Whatever it's called, that Telegram, 4 did the victim do anything provocative other than to enter that room? 5 MR. WOLPIN: It's his appearance that was viewed 6 7 with others who are also --THE COURT: You agree he didn't do anything 8 9 provocative other than to appear in the room? 10 Not in language. In appearance with MR. WOLPIN: 11 others who are Bowl Patrol folks in a chat room run by Chris, 12 that was the beginning. That was sort of an unexpected -- to 13 be clear, this is not something where Chris sought out contact 14 with him that day or the initial contact comes from that. So 15 this idea that there's a long-standing plan and it came to 16 fruition on that day, Chris was not expecting to have any 17 contact with Cheddar Mane that day. 18 THE COURT: No, that's a different statement from there was a long-standing plan to try to dox Vic Mackey and to 19 20 try to threaten people who might be able to give him 21 information to dox Vic Mackey. That seems to be clear from 22 the evidence in the case. 23 MR. WOLPIN: Yes. 24 THE COURT: I agree with you that there's no 25 evidence to suggest that he planned that this will occur on

June 16th, that instead there are these circumstances someone, the victim said it wasn't him, we don't have any evidence it was him, communicated with Peach about a photo. Peach shared that information with the defendant. The defendant responded and said he didn't think it was Mr. Lambert who shared that information.

Mr. Lambert then joins the Peaceful White Folk
Telegram channel. He testified he didn't know that the
defendant was associated with it. We have no evidence to call
that into question. The defendant, though, I understand sees
him there, identifies him with the Bowl Patrol, connects it
with the photograph that occurred that was commented on to
Peach, and at that point becomes in your view upset again that
Lambert is again trying to disrupt his life or interfere with
him in ways that he didn't want to be interfered with.

MR. WOLPIN: Yes, and then within the context of how that conversation evolves, there's another reference to Peach, it's another sort of menacing type statement, and that's when we get the statement that really is the crux of --

THE COURT: Right, but you're leaving out the victim trying to deescalate the situation and your client being unwilling to deescalate.

MR. WOLPIN: My -- yes. I mean, Chris's frustration is he believes there's more going on here and Cheddar Mane is saying, I'm not involved, I'm not involved,

and that's not something that Chris finds credible and that's what's sort of driving that continuing conversation.

I do want to address this concept of doxing. I mean, it's implicit in this case. It's also in and of itself not an illegal act and commonplace, fortunately or unfortunately, in this group. It's not a social good question. We're not arguing that the Court should assign altruistic motives and this is a social good.

We're arguing that the inevitability of his doxing was not Chris's doing. Chris could have taken much more aggressive efforts --

THE COURT: I'm not sentencing him because Mr.

Lambert's identity became public, if that's what you're worried about. I'm sentencing him because he threatened to rape Mr. Lambert's wife in front of his children in order to extort something from him. That's what he's getting sentenced for and the other crimes which he's --

MR. WOLPIN: Understood. But my concern is the presentation about impact and how this has impacted Cheddar Mane and his family. It is very hard to untangle those two things because the hockey business, that's not because of a threat. That's because ultimately his identity in his own words were revealed, and the community has decided that that's not someone they want in that position. That's not, you know, Chris's action and, you know, A to B to get to that result.

And so I agree that the Court is considering the dispute between these two men for I believe what it is.

As to this concept of mitigation and could have deleted it, brings up other concerns obviously with defendants who go about deleting information that relates to their case. I mean there's certainly circumstances as defense attorneys when that's flipped on its head, and the argument is there's hiding, there's deletion -- it could arguably be a crime to tamper with evidence and eliminate evidence.

Certainly I don't recall any conversation between the parties, you know, can you do this, are you willing to do this, can you take this down.

THE COURT: I don't think the length of the sentence is going to be determined by whether he took down the information or not.

MR. WOLPIN: All right.

I mean, ultimately again, the Court is required and should consider the nature and circumstances of the offense which revolved around this dispute between these two men. I do believe that mitigates to a significant degree. We're still looking at a highly -- even time served. He lost his home. He sat in jail. He has gotten COVID in jail. This is not something where anyone who is sort of thinking about a fly by night threat or saying something like this on online is going to view this as something you just get away with or walk

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away from. This has been seriously impactful on his life,
will continue to be through supervision, and certainly will be
on the punitive end, and that the whole time I've been working
with him he's been in jail.
           If I could have a moment, your Honor.
           THE COURT: Yes.
           (Attorney Wolpin confers with the defendant)
           MR. WOLPIN: I would just reserve -- to the extent
I haven't addressed orally arguments in the motion about
computer monitoring, about application of the departures, I
would just incorporate those within and not address those.
           THE COURT: Yeah. So obviously we're mostly
concerned with getting the length of the sentence right here,
and I'm sure that's the biggest concern your client has here.
          MR. WOLPIN: Of course.
           THE COURT: But I am concerned with crafting a
monitoring of Internet access as narrowly -- narrowly so that
we can to the maximum extent possible preserve the defendant's
ability to lawfully use the Internet for work and other things
while appropriately allowing supervision of his activities.
I'm willing to work with the parties about crafting that, but
I'm not sure it makes tremendous sense to devote lengthy
argument to it now.
           I think that clearly there is -- and we can talk
about it if necessary, but the government's suggestion I think
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    is the way this software would operate is that it would keep a
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    record of what he did, but it wouldn't be subject to
    inspection without -- could we craft a condition that allowed
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    for the monitoring to occur but not routine inspection of the
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    data that is collected without reasonable suspicion to believe
    the defendant has engaged in conduct that would violate, and
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    perhaps we should do another hearing on that later. We can do
    it by Zoom or something.
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               But that's -- I'm sensitive to the fact that
    despite the defendant's use of the computer to commit these
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    crimes a blanket kind of -- certainly a blanket prohibition on
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    use would be problematic, but even a monitoring and routine
    inspection of routine interactions that the defendant has
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14
    could impair his ability to use the computer for work-related
15
    purposes because certain employers might not be willing to
16
    allow that kind of inspection.
17
                So I'm aware of the concern, I want to address it,
    but the most important thing today is to get the sentence
18
19
    right.
20
               MR. WOLPIN: We agree.
21
                THE COURT:
                           So I take your argument. We can talk
22
    about that in a minute if we need to.
23
               MR. WOLPIN:
                             Thank you.
24
               THE COURT: Mr. Cantwell, you have an opportunity
25
    to speak. You don't have to say anything. I won't hold it
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against you if you don't. But if there is anything you want
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    to say, I'll be happy to hear it.
 3
                Do you want to say anything?
 4
                THE DEFENDANT: I do. There's a couple of things I
 5
    want to say.
                THE COURT: Yeah, go right ahead.
 6
 7
               MR. WOLPIN: Your Honor, could I just ask for a
    moment?
 8
 9
                THE COURT: Yeah.
               Mr. Cantwell, if you're more comfortable sitting,
10
11
    you can do that, or stand, whatever you're comfortable doing,
12
    but consult with your lawyers first.
13
                (Attorney Wolpin confers with the defendant)
14
                THE DEFENDANT: Is this suitable?
15
                THE COURT: I can hear you fine, yes.
16
                THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
17
                So the only thing that I want to convey -- I think
18
    Mike Tyson is quoted as saying everybody has a plan until they
19
    get punched in the face. And while I certainly haven't been
20
    punched in the face today, it's kind of like the metaphors
21
    that I'm sort of in the habit of using.
22
                THE COURT: Hang on just one second.
23
                Counsel, could you move that microphone a little
    bit closer to him so that he can be heard?
24
25
                THE DEFENDANT: And so I had written a pretty
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lengthy thing, which I am not going to go through today.

I think that what has been lost here and has frustrated me, and as I've done my best to speak to my attorneys, is that my lived experience is that this problem continued perpetually literally every day for eight months and it consisted of threats of violence against me, but I could not attribute them to individuals because they behaved functionally -- I don't know if you're familiar with the term black block, okay? This is when you see these anarchists running around in the streets dressed in all black breaking windows and stuff because -- and it's difficult to identify them because they're all dressed the same, okay? It's a tactic that they use to avoid liability for their crimes, all right?

And these guys, this is exactly what they did on the Internet, and this was reflected to some extent in a 302 of Cheddar Mane's interview with the FBI or with the prosecution. I forget. There were several different 302s that I read. And he said that he had many different screen names that he used with names as innocuous as FU, but using the full word. I mean, like that N word was -- like names like this he used. He created countless fake accounts, as did the entire Bowl Patrol group.

And so my lived experience is the Bowl Patrol is perpetually, constantly harassing me, threatening me, trying

to destroy my business, pretending to be me, defaming me, telling people -- trying to stir violence against me saying that I ratted on the Rise Above Movement, guys who were convicted of fighting down in Charlottesville, which I didn't do by the way.

I gave video to the FBI in cooperation with their investigation voluntarily because we were being accused of things that we didn't do down there and I wanted to do the right thing. And I gave them my body camera video and I gave them all the information that I had about what happened down there because what they were under the impression of was false.

And so, you know, when the Bowl Patrol is running around saying that I ratted out the Rise Above Movement, they knew that wasn't true. They were trying to get guys to harm me. That's my lived experience with this.

And I did not attribute any of those threats to Cheddar Mane because I couldn't. You know, when the FBI asked me, did he threaten you, I said, no, I can't say that he did because I never saw him actually do that, but a lot of this was coming in.

And so when Peach sends me this screenshot, okay, she says, is this Cheddar Mane, and, yes, I initially say, I don't think so, why would I think that's Cheddar Mane.

Later on in that conversation, I think that we

glossed over that chat log a little too quickly and I hope that you'll take another look at it, okay, is that she explains to me, I took this picture of his kids and he got all weird about me taking the picture so I never sent it to you. And so when she sends me this screen cap of the message that she's getting, my perception is, after it's explained to me, that has to be Cheddar because nobody else would have known she took those photos. Cheddar is super scared that somebody is going to dox him, that he's going to get identified, he wouldn't run around telling everybody that Katelen has pictures of his kids, okay?

So my perception of this is I have a constant stream of nonstop harassment that I've been to law enforcement about repeatedly asking for help. They're ignoring my cries for help. And then this guy -- he goes from me to this woman who I asked to marry me and so -- I'm sorry. When he comes into the chat the next day and then he tells me that he left me alone, I know that that's not true. I know that he's lying because he was just harassing Katelen earlier that day, and so when it's portrayed as he's trying to deescalate the conflict, that's not my perception of it.

My perception is he's continuing this. He's lying to me. He's trying to avoid responsibility for what he's been doing, which is a constant pattern that's been going on now for eight months, and this was something that happened because

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they didn't think I was supportive enough of a guy walking
into a synagogue and killing a bunch of people. That was what
motivated their vendetta against me, that I said I don't want
you to promote this stuff on my platforms.
          And so they -- you know, that was my lived
experience of it in any case, and I don't believe that he was
innocent. When he showed up in that chat room with that name,
the mistake that he made was that he showed up using an
account that I could identify.
           Cheddy Blac was not his username in other contexts.
That was just something that bore enough resemblance to the
Cheddar Mane name that I recognized it that I called him out,
and then he got scared and he tried to backpedal and he tried
to get his way out of it, you know.
           And so it is true that I had threatened to dox him
previously, it's true that I associated that with Vic, but
when I get these photos from Peach -- I had never seen or
heard of Mrs. Lambert before that day, okay? I never -- I'm
not even sure I knew if he had kids. I knew he was
married but, like, you know --
           THE COURT:
                      Excuse me. You don't have to answer
this if you don't want to but --
           THE DEFENDANT: I'm happy to answer your question.
           THE COURT: -- given all that you're saying to me,
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I'm just a little confused about something, and don't answer

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if you don't want to, but when did you learn Cheddar Mane's
 1
    identity?
 2
                THE DEFENDANT: I learned -- Peach had sent me a
 3
 4
    photograph of her, Cheddar, and Hard Mouse sitting on a couch
 5
    when she went to go visit them in the fall of 2018. So that's
 6
    what I had.
 7
               And I knew that Peach had been to his house at that
    point because she told me about the visit, and at that time
 8
 9
    things were copacetic. Things were, you know, reasonably
10
    friendly or whatever, right?
11
                THE COURT: So you knew at that point that this
12
    person she had visited was Cheddar Mane?
13
                THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. And so I knew that I could
14
    identify Cheddar Mane, but at that point I had never gone to,
15
    like, get the information, right?
16
                THE COURT: I got it. I got it.
17
                THE DEFENDANT: And so what happens is when he
18
    shows up in the chat, and you could cross reference the
19
    timestamps, I say to Peach, give me those photos and the
20
    address, okay, and that's when I go to obtain the information.
21
               Now, I could have done this forever ago, and the
22
    prosecution pointed out that I doxed the guy Mosin-Nagant,
23
    another one, okay? And when I doxed Mosin-Nagant I never
24
    said, give me Vic Mackey's identifying information, because
25
    there was no doubt that Mosin-Nagant was guilty of what he
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That was when Mosin-Nagant posted my address on Twitter
 1
    did.
 2
    under his own Twitter handle, okay?
                So there was no doubt that Mosin-Nagant had
 3
    published my address, so I just went ahead and published
 4
    Mosin-Nagant's address. I just published his information.
 5
    didn't say give me something.
 6
 7
               What happened with Cheddar Mane was --
                (Attorney Wolpin confers with the defendant)
 8
                DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you.
 9
               When I'm talking to Cheddar Mane, he tells me, I
10
11
    didn't do this, okay? And I say, well, if you didn't do it,
12
    then give me Vic's identity, he's a better target than you.
13
    All right?
14
                So this emerges -- the point that I'm trying to
15
    make is that this emerges spontaneously in that moment for
16
    that purpose, okay? Yeah, I could have doxed this guy anytime
17
    I wanted to. I could have contacted him anytime I wanted to.
18
    I could have showed up at his house anytime I wanted to, and I
19
    just didn't have any desire to do it.
20
               When he comes into the chat room after he had been
21
    harassing Peach and he lied to me, you know, yeah, this thing
22
    went on for a long time, but that's my lived experience of
23
    what happened, and I guess that's all I've got to say.
24
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
25
                THE DEFENDANT: And I'm happy to answer other
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1
    questions if you got them. I'm happy to do that.
 2
               THE COURT: No. I think I have the gist of your
 3
    position down I think and --
 4
               THE DEFENDANT: And I want to -- sorry. I should
 5
    also say I do regret whatever discomfort I've caused Mrs.
 6
    Lambert, okay?
 7
               I could have had people come in to this courtroom
    and say positive things about me. And when people do that,
 8
    they run the risk of people bothering them online, threats of
 9
10
    violence. I recognize that, and I don't want to have anybody
11
    come do that for me for that reason.
12
               To the best of my knowledge she's an innocent
13
    person, so I do feel bad about that. Again, it wasn't a
14
    thought-out thing with her. This was something that is like
15
    -- I'm in the middle of this conversation and I get this
16
    picture, and I don't mean to cause her, you know, any trouble.
17
    I don't think that Cheddar Mane is an innocent victim,
18
    frankly, but to the extent that she is, I'm sorry for whatever
19
    discomfort I've caused her because that wasn't my goal.
20
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
                                                    I appreciate
21
    that.
22
               Anything else from the defense counsel before I
23
    impose sentence?
24
               MR. WOLPIN: No.
25
               THE COURT: Anything else from the government?
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MS. KRASINSKI: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. I'm going to decline the defendant's motions for departure and variance. I determine that the defendant's total offense level is 20, his Criminal History Category is III, that no departures or variance is warranted. I'm going to sentence the defendant to a sentence at the bottom of the applicable range of 41 months. Let me explain my thinking.

Let me start with the Criminal History Category calculation. I think it's a close call in my mind. The defendant does qualify as a Criminal History Category III literally.

The defense put forth some arguments that I took very seriously about the age of the one point attributed for the DUI conviction and I carefully considered the defendant's argument that the two points that resulted from the fact that the crimes were committed while the defendant was under a period of supervision is technically a correct adjustment, but when I look at this defendant holistically and his background, it's borderline whether he's a Criminal History Category II or III. I think he meets it. I think I can take into account the borderline nature of this by determining where in the range to sentence the defendant, and I have done so and concluded that a sentence at the bottom of the applicable

range is warranted.

I do think that in this case the fact that the defendant threatened the victim's family member is an aggravating circumstance that would ordinarily justify a sentence higher than the bottom of the applicable range. So why am I sentencing the defendant at the bottom of the range?

The threats here that the defendant made are abhorrent, shocking, they are extremely damaging, and I don't diminish those, the seriousness of those threats to any degree. It's just horrendous threats. So I want to make that clear right from the outset.

Why then would I sentence at the bottom of the range? I want to evaluate the provocation argument that the defendants put forth for a variance.

I don't believe that there was provocation in this case that warrants a downward variance. I largely accept the revised chronology that the government has produced today as being a correct description of what occurred here, and I do agree with Mr. Cantwell's position to this extent. I think the members of the Bowl Patrol were trying to drive him crazy. They were trying to deprive him of his ability to earn a living, they were trying to disrupt his program, and Mr. Cantwell chose a criminal and ultimately criminal and certainly irresponsible way to respond to that effort, but I don't believe it warrants a variance for provocation because I

do believe that while the victim in this case was a participant with other Bowl Patrol members in some of the early trolling behavior that occurred here, I'm not satisfied that the immediate incident was precipitated by any provocation by the victim in this case.

I don't believe and I'm not persuaded that the communication to Peach about the photo came from the victim. We don't know who communicated with Peach about that, but the defendant according to the screenshots did not believe that Mr. Lambert was the source of that communication.

And what happened here, Mr. Lambert entered into the Peaceful White Person site and that in and of itself is not provocation under these circumstances to justify in any way, shape, or form Mr. Cantwell's behavior.

I understand from your perspective you thought this guy, you know, was part of a campaign to drive you crazy, and I do not doubt that you were extremely agitated when you saw him there and you disregarded his efforts to deescalate because you determined he was part of a group of people that were still out to get you, but I can't say that you were provoked in any way in the immediate sense by what occurred there. You engaged in threatening behavior to Mr. Lambert and he responded in a way that was unacceptable in my view and does imply a threat against someone you care deeply about. And then you escalate it further, and that's where you engaged

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in the conduct that resulted in your presence here today, and I don't believe that that is provocation that justifies a sentence below the bottom of the applicable range.

But I do understand the human circumstances you were in. You felt these people were trying to destroy you, they were trying to drive you crazy, you were extremely agitated, you thought Mr. Lambert was a part of that group.

And there was a pattern in your interactions with him in which you both had become desensitized to the horrendous nature of your interactions with each other, and that's the only reason that I'm not giving you a sentence above the top of the range, that I'm not in fact varying upward in this case, because the conduct you engaged in in my mind is so serious and so damaging that it ordinarily warrants an even higher sentence than the one that I have imposed here. But I've tried to understand your circumstances and why you ended up where you did, and I tried to take that into account as best I could, and given the totality of those circumstances I've decided not to sentence you at the top of the range, not to vary above the range, but to give you a guideline sentence which still is a very significant period of incarceration. understand that and I believe that the interests of justice require it.

In developing a sentence here I have to consider what a just sentence is, and as I said, the nature of your

behavior is so serious, so egregiously wrong that justice requires a significant prison sentence.

And I think both individual and general deterrence require a significant prison sentence here, and that's why I'm imposing it.

I believe that I'm avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity by sentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment within the guideline range.

So I am going to impose a sentence of imprisonment of 41 months, which is the bottom of the applicable range.

I want to reserve the right to consult with the parties about the Internet supervision condition in a later telephone conference, because I want to make every effort to craft a condition that serves the government's interests while also protecting the defendant's ability to engage in lawful business activities using the computer when he completes his sentence.

Let me read the sentence as I propose to give it:

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and
having considered the sentencing factors enumerated at 18

U.S.C. Section 3553(a), it is the judgment of the Court that
the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau
of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 41 months. This
term consists of a term of 41 months on Counts 1 and 2 to be
served concurrently.

Upon release from imprisonment the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of two years. This term consists of two years on Count 1 and a term of one year on Count 2, such terms to be served concurrently.

Within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons the defendant shall report in person to the district to which the defendant is released.

While under supervision the defendant must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court and the defendant must comply with the mandatory and proposed special conditions attached to the presentence report except for the computer monitoring condition which we will have a further discussion about and it will eventually get incorporated in the judgment in an effort to try to address the specific concerns raised in the defendant's memorandum.

It is ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of \$200. It shall be due in full immediately.

The Court will waive the fine in this case as the defendant does not appear to have the financial ability to pay one.

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

Are there any objections from the government to this proposed sentence other than the ones raised during the

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    course of this hearing?
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               MS. KRASINSKI: Your Honor, I think as it relates
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    to Count 2 the statutory maximum is 24 months of imprisonment.
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    So I think -- if I heard the Court correctly --
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                THE COURT: Why did I miss that? I'm sorry.
               MS. KRASINSKI: -- I think you said 41 months of
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 7
    imprisonment on both, but I think it should be 41 months on
    Count 1 and then 24 months on Count 2.
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 9
                THE COURT: That I think is a mistake.
    apologize.
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11
               Yes. So Count 2 is a 24-month sentence to run
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    concurrently with the 41-month sentence imposed on Count 1.
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                Thank you, counsel, for drawing that to my
14
    attention. I apologize.
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               All of the defendant's objections as stated in his
16
    memorandum and during this hearing are preserved for purposes
17
    of appeal.
18
               Beyond that, is there anything else you need to
19
    bring to my attention?
20
               MR. WOLPIN: No, your Honor.
21
               THE COURT: All right.
22
                I'll impose the sentence as I've read it.
                So you went to trial in this case. You have a
23
24
    right to appeal. To perfect that appeal, you need to file a
25
    Notice of Appeal within 14 days or you lose your right to
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appeal. You can ask your lawyers to file the notice on your behalf or you can file it yourself if you want to, you can ask the clerk's office for help, but it has to be filed within 14 days or you lose your right to appeal. So unless you're planning to give up your right to appeal, tell your lawyers, file that notice for me, because otherwise you'll lose your right to appeal. All right. Is there anything else that we need to take up today? No? Okay. Thank you. That concludes the hearing. (Conclusion of hearing at 1:03 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T EI, Susan M. Bateman, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate transcription of the within proceedings, to the best of my knowledge, skill, ability and belief. Submitted: 5-4-21 /s/ Susan M. Bateman SUSAN M. BATEMAN, RPR, CRR